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PREVIEW—County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund:
Clean Water Act Regulation of Point Source Pollution Conveyed
through Groundwater
Connlan William Whyte*
The Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral arguments
in this matter on Wednesday, November 6, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. at the
Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C. Elbert Lin will likely appear
for the Petitioner. David Lane Henkin will likely appear for the
Respondents. Solicitor General, Noel J. Francisco, will argue on behalf of
the United States.
I.

INTRODUCTION

County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund asks whether the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”) requires a polluter to acquire a permit when
pollutants originate from within a point source but are conveyed to
navigable waters through a nonpoint source, such as sediment erosion or
groundwater.1 The petitioner, the County of Maui (“County”), owns and
operates four wells with the Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility
(“LWRF”) that discharge wastewater into the groundwater and,
eventually, into the Pacific Ocean.2 Wastewater marked with dye was
deposited in three of the four wells and later found in the Pacific Ocean
after seeping through groundwater.3 The Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, Sierra
Club, Surfrider Foundation, and West Maui Preservation Association
(collectively here “Respondents”) sued, alleging that the County’s four
sewage injection wells require permits under the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) for the transfer of wastewater
through groundwater to navigable waters.4
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Since 1985, the County has operated four injection wells at the
LWRF and injects three to five million gallons of treated sewage into the

*

Connlan Whyte, J.D. & M.P.A Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett
III School of Law at the University of Montana.
1.
Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 742 (9th
Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Maui II].
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 743.
4.
Id.; A party “violates the CWA when it does not obtain [a NPDES]
permit and (1) discharges (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from a point
source; however, under 33 U.S.C.§§ 1311(a) and 1342(a)(1), a party “who obtains a
NPDES permit is exempt from the general prohibition on point source pollution. Id.
at 744 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,
243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001); see infra Section III, Subsection A.
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groundwater per day.5 Seeking to better understand the hydrological
connections between the injected wastewater and the coastal waters, the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the Hawaii Department of
Health (“HDOH”), and others commissioned a tracer dye study (“Study”)
to track the treated effluent travels.6
In June 2013, those groups, with assistance from the University of
Hawaii, dyed the effluent being injected into three of the four County
wells, and eighty-four days later, researchers documented the presence of
dyed wastewater in the nearby Pacific Ocean.7 Approximately sixty-four
percent of the sewage effluent was found to have made its way to the
Pacific Ocean. The Study also suggested, and the County conceded, that
all four wells transferred sewage to the ocean in the same manner.8
Accordingly, the Study showed that the County’s wells were connected to
navigable waters via groundwater.9
In 2014, the Respondents sued the County in the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii, alleging that the CWA required
the County to have NPDES permits for its wells because they transferred
effluent from four point sources—through the groundwater—to navigable
waters.10 The County moved to dismiss, claiming that the pollutants were
not covered by the CWA because they passed through a nonpoint source
before entering navigable waters. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Respondents.11
The County appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, claiming that the LWRF’s wells do not fall under NPDES
jurisdiction and that the County was not given fair notice of any CWA
violations.12 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) the
County was liable under the CWA for the unpermitted discharge of
effluent, which was fairly traceable, into navigable waters in more than a
de minimis amount; and (2) the County had fair notice, consistent with due
process requirements, that the CWA prohibited these discharges without a
permit.13 The Court based its opinion on the traceable nature of the
pollutants and the isolation and identification of the wells as sources.14
Suggesting that any other ruling would be a mockery of the intent of the
CWA, the Court stated the case was “about preventing the County from
5.
Id. at 742.
6.
Id.
7.
Id. at 742–43.
8.
Id. at 743.
9.
Id.
10.
Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 983
(D. Haw. 2014) [hereinafter Maui I].
11.
Id. at 1005.
12.
Maui II, 886 F.3d at 742.
13.
Id. at 752.
14.
Id. at 749, 752; cf. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 713 F.3d 502, 508 (9th Cir. 2013) (deeming the pollution in question not easily
trackable to one source, where the sources in question were not easily regulated by
nature).
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doing indirectly that which it cannot do directly.”15 The County petitioned
for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which agreed
on February 19, 2019, to hear the case.16
III.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A.

Background

In 1972, Congress passed the CWA “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”17 and
to encourage that “waste treatment management planning processes be
developed and implemented to assure adequate control of sources of
pollutants in each State.”18 The CWA stipulates that pollution from a point
source into navigable waters must have an NPDES permit to monitor its
levels of pollution.19 A point source is “any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, [or] well . . . .”20 Navigable waters are defined as “the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”21 Most wells
that discharge sewage directly into groundwater do not require NPDES
permits because the effluent is not going into navigable water but instead
into the groundwater.22 For example, in League of Wilderness Defenders
v. Forsgren, the Ninth Circuit held that a nonpoint source of pollution is
“the type of pollution that arises from many dispersed activities over large
areas, and is not traceable to any single discrete source.”23 Further, the
Sixth Circuit in Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities
Company, held that groundwater is not a point source because it is “neither
confined nor discrete” and one cannot “discern its precise contours as can
be done with traditional point sources like pipes, ditches, or tunnels.”24
In 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) released
a report on proposed rule changes for concentrated animal feeding
operations (“CAFO”).25 Within the report, the EPA stated that the
pollution caused by CAFOs was to be regulated as point source pollution
under the CWA even though the pollution was transferred through

15.
16.

Maui II, 886 F.3d at 752.
County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 139 S. Ct. 1164

(2019).
17.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) (2012).
18.
Id.
19.
Id. §§ 407, 1342.
20.
Id. § 1362(14).
21.
Id. § 1362(7).
22.
Id. § 407.
23.
309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002).
24.
905 F.3d 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2018).
25.
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation
and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2,960 (Jan. 12, 2001).
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groundwater before it entered navigable waters.26 The EPA’s NPDES
report stated that “about 40 percent of the average annual stream flow is
from groundwater”; therefore groundwater that has a direct hydrological
connection to navigable waters can be regulated under the CWA.27
Further, the Fourth Circuit in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy
Partners, L.P. held that the CWA’s “from a point source”28 language refers
to a starting point of pollution, and thus point source pollution that passes
through groundwater and into navigable waters should be regulated.29
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit held that an “indirect” transfer of pollutants from
a point source to navigable waters would require an NPDES permit.30
B.

Petitioner’s Arguments

The County argues that the Respondents have misinterpreted the
CWA’s longstanding treatment of point source pollution.31 The County
asserts that the CWA does not have a regulatory scheme that requires
coverage of nonpoint source pollution, which would be an “enormous and
transformative expansion” of the CWA.32 Moreover, the County argues
that the CWA clearly sets up a “means-of-delivery test” and the phrase
“from . . . any point source” refers to a direct connection between the point
source and navigable waters, not a starting point of pollution.33 The
County claims: (1) CWA’s statutory language unequivocally sets out a
“means-of-delivery”34 test through the statute’s definition of “discharge of
pollutants”;35 (2) the “means-of-delivery” test conforms with the structure
of the CWA; and (3) the test requires point sources to be the “means-ofdelivery” of the pollution into navigable waters, not the “proximate
cause.”36
Additionally, the County argues that “[t]he CWA’s ‘substantial’
penalties also call for the predictability provided by the means-of-delivery
test.”37 Accordingly, a pollutant transferred through groundwater lacks the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 2,964.
Id. at 3,016.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A).
887 F.3d 637, 650 (4th Cir. 2018).
Maui II, 886 F.3d at 768.
Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 1, Aug. 19, 2019, No. 18-260.
Id. (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324

(2014)).
33.
Id. at 3; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12); see also Sierra Club v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 409 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that if a plaintiff
shows a direct hydrological connection between a point source and groundwater, the
transfer of the pollution through the groundwater must be regulated by NPDES
permits).
34.
Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 3.
35.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
36.
Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 11–12.
37.
Id. at 12 (quoting United States Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes
Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2016)).
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predictability of point source pollution found within the CWA’s definition
of “point source.”38 Further, the County contends that the legislative
history of the CWA supports the means-of-delivery test through Congress’
refusal to recognize groundwater specific proposals39and that Congress
specifically “entrusted nonpoint source pollution, like releases from the
County’s wells, to the States.”40
The County argues that the Court has confirmed its interpretation
of the means-of-delivery test through both Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S Army Corps
of Engineers.41 The UARG Court held that the EPA’s interpretation of the
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) placed “plainly excessive demands on limited
governmental resources[,]” which “alone was a good reason for rejecting
it.”42 The County asserts that the Court’s holding of an “excessive”
interpretation of a statute applies to the Respondents’ “excessive”
interpretation of the CWA.43 Secondly, the SWANCC Court held that
“Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret
a statute to push the limit of congressional authority.”44 Therefore, the
Court should not look at the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA but instead
look for Congress’ clear intent.45
The County further contends that nonpoint source pollution is left
for state regulation because additional federal oversite would upset the
“balance between federally mandated permits and state-led nonpoint
source management programs.”46 Finally, the County argues that its wells
are not polluting into navigable waters, under the CWA, because the “path
between the point source and jurisdictional surface waters is too attenuated
. . . .”47 The County maintains that ground water cannot be considered a
point source because it is neither “confined [n]or discrete.”48
C.

Respondents’ Arguments

Initially, the Respondents argue that a black-letter interpretation
of the “CWA’s core prohibition . . . bars the County’s unpermitted
‘addition of [a] pollutant’—the Facility’s effluent—'to navigable
waters’—the Pacific Ocean—'from [a] point source’—the wells.”49 The
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 13–14; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18; 573 U.S. at 324; 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001).
573 U.S. at 324.
Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 20 (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

531 U.S. at 172–73.
Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 23 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 22 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).
Br. for Resp’ts at 1, July 12, 2019, No. 18-260 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §

at 324).

1362).
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Respondents contend that the CWA’s provisions not only apply to point
source pollutants “directly” transferred into navigable waters but also to
any pollutants transferred into closely associated navigable waters from
point sources.50 Moreover, they maintain that indirect transfers of
pollutants are covered by the CWA under Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Rapanos v. United States, where he stated “the [CWA] does not forbid the
addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point
source, but rather the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.”51
The Respondents assert that Justice Scalia’s phrasing avoided
writing “directly” into the CWA and instead clarified that the CWA
covered more pollutants than just those transferred “directly” into
navigable waters.52 This argument does not distinguish Scalia’s definition
of “waters of the United States” but instead allows for point source
pollution into those “waters” not directly from point sources but rather
generally “from” point sources.53 The Respondents further assert that the
CWA’s “inclusion of ‘well[s]’” in its definition of “point source”54 directly
alludes to groundwater conveyance as a form of pollutant transfer subject
to NPDES permits.55 The Respondents contend that wells almost
exclusively operate within groundwater rather than in direct contact with
navigable waters.56 Similarly, they state that “[t]he County seeks to rewrite
the [CWA] to apply only when a point source or series of point sources
conveys pollutants directly to navigable waters[,]” which is in direct
conflict with both the Court's ruling in Rapanos and the CWA’s plain
language.57
Further, the Respondents argue that any “addition of pollutants to
a waterbody has taken place whenever the waterbody contains more
pollutants than it did before”58; therefore the County is responsible for the
addition of pollutants to the Pacific Ocean off the west coast of Maui.59
The Respondents also maintain that the LWRF wells are subject to NPDES
regulation because the sewage effluent could “traceably and foreseeably
reach navigable waters.”60 Furthermore, they contend that the County’s
50.
Id. at 12.
51.
Id. at 2–3 (quoting 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006) (plurality) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 739, 743.
54.
Br. for Resp’ts at 13 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 13–14.
58.
Id. at 17 (citing South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee
Tribe, 541 U.S. 95, 109–112 (2004) (holding that the transfer of polluted water
through a point source was subject to NPDES regulation even if the point source did
not pollute the water being transferred into navigable waters)).
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 19 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (holding that pollutants
discharged into intermittent channels that naturally wash downstream into navigable
waters could be regulated by NPDES permits)).
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interpretation of indirect discharges conflicts with Congress’ intended use
of NPDES permits.61 NPDES regulation replaced the prior Refuse Act,62
and federal circuit courts had interpreted the Refuse Act broadly to include
indirect deposits of refuse.63 Lastly, the Respondents argue that
groundwater protection under the CWA would complement other water
protection statutes such as the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”),64 thus
supporting the Court’s consideration in uniting statutes within the same
field of concern.65
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. The Clean Water Act’s Plain Language
The Court must address the directness required for point source
transfer of pollution to navigable waters. In deciding this case, the Court
will have to grapple with some of the questions left unanswered in
Rapanos.66 Interpretation of the CWA’s plain language will be central to
this analysis. The County contends that the CWA regulates point source
pollution when it directly enters navigable waters.67 The Respondents
disagree and state that a point source must be the origin of the pollution,
and the conveyance of the pollution must directly connect to the point
source.68 As in Rapanos, the question here concerns whether the plain
language of the CWA applies to pollution conveyance through
groundwater, a nonpoint source. There, the Court held, in a plurality
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, that the filling of ditches next to
wetlands did not violate the CWA because the Plaintiffs could not prove a
“significant nexus” between the ditches and wetlands.69
The Court currently consists of five justices from the Rapanos
opinion, three of whom were in the majority and two in the dissent. Those
members of the Court will likely approach the issue of interpretation of
the CWA as they did in Rapanos.70 In Rapanos, Chief Justice Roberts
wrote a separate concurrence expressing frustration that none of the
61.
Id. at 25.
62.
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1899).
63.
Br. for Resp’ts at 25 (citing United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co.
of P.R., 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3rd Cir. 1967) (holding that an oil discharge with close
proximity to the sea was not a direct deposit of refuse into the sea but was covered by
the Refuse Act because the refuse was deposited in close proximity to the sea and its
indirect transfer to the sea was easily foreseeable)).
64.
42 U.S.C. § 300f.
65.
Br. for Resp’ts at 49 (citing POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,
573 U.S. 102, 115 (2014) (holding that statutes with complimentary purpose are read
as to give effect to each other rather than to displace each other)).
66.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743.
67.
Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 12.
68.
Br. for Resp’ts at 2–3.
69.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.
70.
Id. at 715.
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opinions commanded a majority and that the Army Corps of Engineers
and EPA were unable to promulgate regulations in response to SWANCC,
which would have “merit[ed] deference under [the Court’s] generous
standards . . . .”71 Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s plurality, which
concluded the CWA does not regulate non-surface waters that transfer
pollution, or, as Justice Scalia put it, the “plain language of the [CWA]
simply does not authorize . . . [a] ‘Land Is Waters’ approach to federal
jurisdiction.”72
Nonetheless, both Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined in Justice
Steven’s dissent asserting that the wetlands in question were
interconnected with the filled-in channels, and therefore the CWA
applied.73 With Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh
having joined the Court since it decided Rapanos, it is uncertain how those
members Court will interpret the language of the CWA. However, both
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh clerked for Justice Kennedy in 1993.74
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos came to the same
conclusion as Justice Scalia’s plurality, but Justice Kennedy proposed that
cases like Rapanos still need to analyze nonpoint sources like
groundwater.75 Kennedy believed that if a “significant nexus” could be
found between the groundwater—that conveyed the pollutants—and the
polluted navigable waters then the point source of pollution should be
regulated under the CWA.76 Justice Kennedy, through cases like SWANCC
and Rapanos, has shown a pragmatic approach in interpreting the CWA77
and his former clerks, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, may share that
approach and find that the groundwater at issue has a “significant nexus”
with the Pacific Ocean.78
The Court will likely look at the definition of point source within
the CWA and interpret the phrase, “from which pollutants are or may be
discharged.”79 The Court will likely analyze whether “from” merely
denotes a starting place for the pollution or the prior source of the pollution
before it entered navigable waters.80 If the Court holds that “from” denotes
71.
Id. at 757–58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
72.
Id. at 734, 755.
73.
Id. at 787–88 (Stevens, J., with Souter, J., Breyer, J., Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
74.
Richard Wolf, Basketball, Popeyes, 2 Live Crew: The year Neil
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh clerked for Anthony Kennedy, USA TODAY (Aug. 30,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/30/brett-kavanaughneil-gorsuch-learned-supreme-court-ropes-together/1050836002/.
75.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76.
Id. (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167).
77.
Norman A. Dupont, Justice Kennedy and Environmental Water
Cases: A Pragmatic Approach To Water from a Western Perspective, AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/tre
nds/2018-2019/september-october-2018/justice-kennedy-and-environmental/.
78.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167).
79.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
80.
See Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 12.; Br. for Resp’ts at 2–3.
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the need for direct connection between the LWRF wells and the Pacific
Ocean, then the analysis of the plain language will end. However, if the
Court finds that “from” merely denotes a starting point for the pollution,
it will most likely apply the “significant nexus” test.81 Because the
undisputed facts show a traceable hydrologic connection between the
LWRF wells, the groundwater, and the Pacific Ocean, the Court may hold
that a significant nexus exists.82 If the Court chooses not to apply the
“significant nexus” test, then it may find that the LWRF wells are not
polluting directly into the Ocean but instead into a nonpoint source that
could be regulated by the State of Hawaii.83
Further, to address point source pollution transfer, the Court may
examine Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos.84 Justice Scalia chose not
write “directly” into the language of point source transfer under the CWA,
suggesting the Court may regard his comments as dicta.85 However, lower
courts have interpreted his comments differently, so the Court may wish
to set a standard with this case. In Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit held that
groundwater was not discernible and could not be covered under the
CWA.86 Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit in Kinder held that “from . . . a
point source” denoted a starting point, not the actual conveyance, of a
pollutant and thus groundwater could be regulated under the CWA.87
Considering this circuit split on groundwater and the CWA, the parties
may push the Court to clarify—once and for all—whether the CWA covers
pollution conveyances through entities like groundwater.
Lastly, the EPA has sought an alternative solution to the issue and
has stated that the Court should add a groundwater exception within the
definition of “point source.”88 The Court may consider the EPA’s input
on the issue because “[a]gencies delegated rulemaking authority under a
statute such as the Clean Water Act are afforded generous leeway by the
courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer.”89
However, the EPA has not refined its position on the ambiguous nature of
groundwater under the CWA, and has left [l]ower courts and regulated
entities . . . to feel their way on a case-by-case basis” as they interpret the

81.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715.
82.
Maui II, 886 F.3d at 743.
83.
See Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 21 (arguing that applying federal jurisdiction
to nonpoint source regulation is an overstep that violates the CWA).
84.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755.
85.
Id.
86.
Kentucky Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 933.
87.
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650 (quoting § 1362(12)(A)).
88.
Norman A. Dupont, County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund: A
Preview of the Supreme Court’s Review of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction over
Groundwater,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASS’N
(May
10,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/tre
nds/2018-2019/may-june-2019/county-of-maui/.
89.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–845 (1984)).
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CWA and its inclusion of groundwater-connected pollution.90 Therefore,
the Court will likely attempt to create a clear interpretation of the CWA—
before it gives deference to the EPA— since the EPA has yet to clarify
groundwater’s ambiguity under the CWA.91 Further, the EPA’s
interpretation derives from Justice Scalia’s language in Rapanos, which is
also responsible for the overly ambiguous treatment of the CWA.
Therefore, the Court will likely seek to remedy the confusion around
Rapanos rather than defer authority to the EPA.92
B.

Congress’ Intent Behind the Clean Water Act

In correcting the ambiguity of the CWA, the Court will likely look
at Congress’ intent behind the “point source” definition and the CWA as
a whole.93 First, Respondents assert that the CWA’s inclusion of wells as
specific point sources must mean that the CWA was intended to regulate
groundwater,94 whereas the County contends that the regulation of
groundwater would be so excessive that if Congress had intended to
regulate it, it would have explicitly said so in the CWA.95 If the Court finds
that the CWA’s intent was to regulate the transfer of pollutants via
groundwater, then the Court will likely expand upon the “significant
nexus” test in order to create a more concise structure for determining
groundwater regulation.96 However, if the Court does not accept that
Congress intended to regulate pollutants conveyed through groundwater,
then it will find for the County and settle the interpretation of point source
pollution within the CWA.
The Court may consider Respondents’ argument that the prior
Refuse Act reflects congressional intent to regulate broadly using the
CWA.97 The Refuse Act argument may slightly persuade the Court, but its
interpretation did not present the same large-scale effect as the CWA.98
Ultimately, the Court is more likely to look at similar water protection
legislation and how that legislation treats groundwater. Respondents
contend that the SDWA aims to “prevent underground injection from
endangering drinking water sources”;99 therefore the Court may consider
a pro-groundwater-regulation standpoint to create uniformity within the
broad field of regulating water protection.100
Lastly, the Court will look at Congress’ intent in executing the
CWA. On its face, the CWA seeks to “restore and maintain the chemical,
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 755, 758.
33 U.S.C. 1362(14).
Br. for Resp’ts at 13.
Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 21.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715.
Br. for Resp’ts at 25.
Id.
Id. at 49.
See POM Wonderful LLC, 573 U.S. at 115.
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”101 The Court
may choose to interpret CWA’s facial intent more broadly to meet the
mission of the statute rather than to delineate the black-letter meaning of
every phrase. However, if the Court continues to look at the mission of the
CWA, it will find that states have an interest in regulating nonpoint source
pollution, so the Court may give deference to states to regulate
groundwater pollution as a nonpoint source.102
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court has yet to directly address the CWA ambiguity left by
the Rapanos decision and this case offers an excellent opportunity for the
Court to set a standard for interpreting the CWA with respect to
groundwater conveyance of pollutants into navigable waters. As
hydrological sciences progress further—and the science community
consistently identifies the intertwinement of groundwater and water
pollution—the laws that govern its regulation are likely to become more
complex and all encompassing. Ultimately, the Court has a great
opportunity to recognize the connection between groundwaters and
navigable waters to better protect water from both indirect and direct
pollution.

101.
102.

33 U.S.C. 1362 § 1251(a).
Id. § 1251(g); see Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 22.

